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ONSHORE OIL AND GAS LEASING ON PUBLIC
LANDS: AT WHAT POINT DOES NEPA REQUIRE'
THE PREPARATION OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT?
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) has be-
come the major legal instrument for monitoring and litigating
conflicts between oil and gas development, and other resource val-
ues on federal public lands. Courts have differed over whether the
issuance of oil and gas leases triggers NEPA 's environmental im-
pact statement requirement. This Comment suggests that, while
NEPA has some inherent limitations as a land use planning stat-
ute, courts can and should provide aggressive review of agency
leasing decisions in order to effectuate NEPA 's policies.
INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)' re-
quires the government to prepare an environmental impact statement
(EIS) for every major federal action significantly affecting the envi-
ronment. Whether the federal government must prepare an EIS for
the issuance of an oil or gas lease on onshore public lands has been
treated inconsistently by the courts. Specifically, courts have differed
over whether leasing constitutes a significant effect and, if so,
whether lease stipulations which prohibit surface occupancy serve to
preempt the statutory EIS requirement. Given the continuing uncer-
tainties of foreign energy sources and the pressures to increase do-
mestic energy development, a rational framework is needed to recog-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) [hereinafter NEPA].
nize and resolve environmental impacts which flow from leasing.
NEPA may provide such a framework. The agencies responsible for
oil and gas leasing, however, have failed to incorporate NEPA coher-
ently and effectively into the leasing process.
The environmental effects of oil and gas activities can be substan-
tial. At a minimum, exploration is likely to require the construction
of access roads for seismic equipment, the cutting of trees to allow
accurate surveying, and the use of explosives. If full-scale develop-
ment occurs, pipelines, drilling gear, and drilling wastes all will have
an impact.'
This Comment will discuss the requirements and policies of
NEPA, consider the legal and administrative structure of oil and gas
leasing on public lands, and analyze recent case law regarding the
application of NEPA to the issuance of oil and gas leases. The cases
indicate that whether an EIS is required for lease issuance depends,
at the very least, on the type of lease issued and the conditions which
may be attached to it. Whether an EIS is required also seems to
depend on the perceived likelihood of environmental damage in the
particular case and, in no small measure, upon the reviewing court's
policy interpretations regarding NEPA. The statute does not provide
all the answers, and policy analysis constitutes the decisive ingredi-
ent in judicial treatment of the issue.
After evaluating the legal and policy issues involved, this Com-
ment concludes that the decision whether to prepare an EIS should
not be based on the likelihood of environmental harm, but rather on
the scope of the rights granted in the lease. The Comment recom-
mends requiring an EIS at the leasing stage in order to faithfully
effectuate NEPA. The Comment also analyzes leases which avoid
the EIS requirement by prohibiting surface occupancy of the land
containing the mineral estate, or by deferring surface occupancy un-
til the requisite environmental analysis is performed. The Comment
suggests limitations on the use of such leases in order to better inte-
grate environmental planning into leasing decisions.
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969
NEPA was passed by Congress "[t]o declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between
man and his environment [and] to promote efforts which will prevent
or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate
the health and welfare of man. . . .,, NEPA's sponsors sought to
assure that "environmental amenities and values may be given ap-
2. Runge, Energy Exploration on Wilderness: "Privatization" and Public Lands
Management, 60 LAND EcON. 56, 62 (1984).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
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propriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and
technical considerations. . . ."" To that end, NEPA requires that an
EIS be prepared in connection with "every recommendation or re-
port on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 5 Courts
have held that if substantial questions are raised regarding whether
there is a significant effect on the human environment, then an
agency must prepare an EIS.'
In addition to preparation of a comprehensive EIS, NEPA con-
tains other important requirements. Federal government agencies are
required to consider alternatives to the proposed action.7 NEPA also
established, within the Office of the President, a Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ) charged with the duty to analyze environ-
mental trends and information, formulate and recommend national
environmental policies, and evaluate government programs and ac-
tivities in light of those environmental policies.8
The regulations promulgated by the CEQ9 describe in detail the
process and methods of implementing the environmental analysis re-
quired by NEPA. Before the EIS milestone is reached, an agency
normally is required first to prepare an environmental assessment
(EA) in connection with an agency action or proposal. 10 An EA is a
4. Id. § 4332(2)(b).
5. Id. § 4332(2)(c). Although NEPA requires preparation of an environmental
impact statement (EIS) for a "recommendation or report on proposals for legislation,"
most of the attention devoted to NEPA, as well as the majority of NEPA litigation, has
focused on the need for an EIS in connection with "other major Federal actions," usually
consisting of proposals, plans, permit approvals, projects and other actions by federal
agencies. For analysis of NEPA's application to proposals for legislation, see, e.g., Com-
ment, NEPA's Forgotten Clause: Impact Statements for Legislative Proposals, 58
B.U.L. REV. 560 (1978). The present Comment will analyze NEPA's EIS requirement
only as it applies to "other major Federal actions," namely, the recommendation and
issuance of oil and gas leases on public lands.
6. See, e.g., Bob Marshall Alliance v. Watt, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20759, 20760 (D.C. Mont. 1986); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir.
1985); Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't of Agric., 681 F.2d
I172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1982).
7. The EIS itself must contain a discussion of alternatives. 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C)(iii). In addition, whether or not an EIS is called for, all federal agencies
must "study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of
action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of
available resources." Id. § 4332(2)(E).
8. Id. § 4342.
9. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (1986).
10. Id. §§ 1501.3(a), 1501.4(b). Exceptions to the environmental assessment
(EA) requirement occur in cases where an EIS clearly is required, or in situations em-
bracing certain designated "categorical exclusions." Id. § 1501.4(a)-(b).
brief document which determines that an EIS is required or, alterna-
tively, supports a finding of no significant impact (FONSI), which
obviates the need for EIS preparation."1 Thus, for actions other than
those which clearly do, or clearly do not, require an EIS, the EA is
the vehicle for determining whether to proceed with preparation of
an EIS or to issue a FONSI.1 2
In addition to explaining how to implement the required environ-
mental documentation, the CEQ regulations serve other important
functions. Like NEPA, the regulations also provide for discussion
and evaluation of alternatives to the proposed action. 13 The alterna-
tives analysis, the "heart of the environmental impact statement," 4
is designed to "present the environmental impacts of the proposal
and the alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the
issues and providing a clear basis for choice among options by the
decisionmaker and the public."1"
As the last sentence implies, the NEPA process also is designed to
foster public input into federal environmental decisionmaking. After
the need for an EIS has been decided, agencies must publish in the
Federal Register a notice of intent to prepare an EIS, so that inter-
ested persons may participate to influence the scope of the issues in
the EIS.16 Interested persons may comment on a draft EIS,117 and
the agency must respond to these comments in the final EIS."8
The CEQ regulations also state that an EIS must consider cumu-
lative actions and cumulative impacts of the proposed action.1 9 "Cu-
mulative actions" are defined as "[actions], which when viewed with
other proposed actions have cumulatively significant impacts and
should therefore be discussed in the same impact statement. '20 "Cu-
mulative impact" is defined as:
[t]he impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact
of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable
future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person
undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individ-
ually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of
time.21
11. Id. § 1508.4. A finding of no significant impact (FONSI) contains a brief
explanation of why an action other than a categorical exclusion will not significantly
affect the human environment and, thus, why an EIS does not have to be prepared. Id. §
1508.13.
12. Id. § 1508.4.
13. Id. §§ 1502.10, 1502.13-1502.16.
14. Id. § 1502.14.
15. Id.
16. Id. § 1501.7(a)(1).
17. Id. § 1503.1(a)(4).
18. Id. § 1503.4(a).
19. Id. § 1508.25.
20. Id. § 1508.7.
21. Id.
[VOL. 25: 161, 1988] Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
The regulations provide that an agency should consider the severity
of cumulative impacts in determining whether the action "signifi-
cantly" affects the environment and thus requires preparation of an
EIS.22
With respect to oil and gas activities on public lands, an example
of a governmental action which normally would require preparation
of an EIS would be a broad policy proposal by an agency to catego-
rize a large tract of land as "wilderness" (and thus protected from
development) or "nonwilderness" (and thus not so protected). 3 An-
other example would be a site-specific action leading to direct physi-
cal consequences to the environment, such as agency issuance of a
permit to drill on public lands. Both actions, one broad and the other
narrow, will result in a significant impact to the environment,
whether the analysis focuses on the likelihood of harm from the ac-
tion, or the scope of the rights granted by the action.
Leasing, on the other hand, admits of less certainty. Whether an
EIS is required for leasing depends not only on whether a given lease
includes surface occupancy restrictions, but also on a court's inter-
pretation of NEPA regarding those restrictions, and whether a court
applies the "likelihood of harm" analysis or the "scope of rights
granted" analysis.
OIL AND GAS LEASING ON PUBLIC LANDS: A LEGAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE OVERVIEW
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (Leasing Act) 24 authorizes leas-
ing of federal public lands for private resource development.2 5 The
Leasing Act provides for federal control over the rate of leasing, but
not of exploration and development once a lease has been issued.
2
1
The Leasing Act vests authority for issuing leases with the Secretary
of the Interior; the agency which exercises this authority is the Bu-
reau of Land Management (BLM), within the Department of the
Interior.27
An oil or gas lease is a contract which determines the rights and
22. Id. § 1508.27(b)(7).
23. For further discussion of "wilderness" designation, see infra note 54 and ac-
companying text.
24. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) [hereinafter Leasing Act].
25. Id. § 226(a).
26. See Copper Valley Mach. Works v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 481 (1963).
27. 30 U.S.C. §§ 189, 351.
obligations of both parties to the contract.28 The lessee "receives a
property right enforceable against the government."2 9 The Leasing
Act characterizes the lease as conveying absolute rights to drill. 30
BLM has primary responsibility for leasing decisions on lands
under its jurisdiction.3 1 Responsibility for leasing on Forest Service
lands is divided between BLM and the Forest Service, an agency
within the Department of Agriculture. For Forest Service public do-
main lands,3 2 BLM has jurisdiction over the mineral estate, and the
Forest Service has jurisdiction over the surface.3 The Forest Service
prepares the necessary environmental analysis34 but by statute BLM
has final authority over the decision of whether and under what
terms to issue a lease.35 By agreement, the Forest Service issues a
recommendation either to lease with specified terms, or not to lease.
BLM generally accepts the proposal. 8 On the other hand, with re-
gard to Forest Service acquired lands, BLM may issue leases only
with the Forest Service's permission.37
The decision whether to issue an oil and gas lease is discretionary.
The Leasing Act provides that "[a]ll lands subject to disposition
under this Act which are known or believed to contain oil or gas
deposits may be leased by the Secretary [of Interior]."3 In exercis-
ing his discretion, the Secretary of Interior may refuse to lease an
area.39 Moreover, the 'Secretary of Interior may decline to lease
28. See Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 184 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1932);
Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. CI. 1978).
29. Union Oil v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1975).
30. In explaining when a lessee may waive his rights, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1840) and
187(b) specifically refer to the "rights to drill" and the "obligation to drill."
31. Order of the Sec'y of the Interior No. 2948 (Oct. 6, 1972) cited in Edelson,
The Management of Oil and Gas Leasing on Federal Wilderness Lands, 10 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REv. 905, 914 n.54 (1982-83).
32. Public domain lands are those which have been held by the federal govern-
ment since their original acquisition. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 187 (1981), cited in Edelson, supra note 31, at
914 n.55. The other type of federal lands, acquired lands, are those which once were
privately held but have since been acquired by the government. Id. at 181, cited in
Edleson, supra note 31, at 914 n.55.
33. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. FOR-
EST SERVICE, DEP'T OF AGRIC., INTERIM MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN
THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT AND THE FOREST SERVICE (Dec. 30, 1980), cited
in Edelson, supra note 31, at 914 n.57 [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING].
34. Id., cited in Edelson, supra note 31, at 914.
35. 30 U.S.C. §§ 187, 226.
36. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 33, at 4.
37. 30 U.S.C. § 352. Acquired lands are leased under the Mineral Leasing Act
for Acquired Lands. Id. §§ 351-359.
38. Id. §§ 226(1) (emphasis added). Lands subject to the Leasing Act constitute
a very broad category, including most open lands containing known or suspected mineral
deposits. See id. § 181.
39. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965); Burglin v. Morton, 527 F.2d 486,
488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976).
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based solely upon environmental reasons.
40
The Leasing Act does not provide specific standards to guide
BLM's leasing authority, but it authorizes the government to pre-
scribe regulations "necessary to carry out . . the purposes of [the
Act]."4 BLM can control the environmental effects of oil and gas
leasing by several methods. Not only can BLM refuse to lease an
area (or require mitigation measures in drilling permits), but it also
can include protective stipulations in the leases.42 BLM includes a
number of standard stipulations in all leases.43 In addition, special
stipulations may be included in leases for lands that are particularly
sensitive to adverse environmental impact." The strict No Surface
Occupancy (NSO) Stipulation prohibits drilling on the leased land
itself; access to leased minerals must be made by slant drilling from
outside the leased area.45
A variation on the NSO Stipulation is the Contingent Rights Stip-
ulation,48 which prohibits surface occupancy unless and until such
activity is specifically approved by the appropriate agency.47 If the
subsequent EIS determines sufficient adverse environmental impacts
due to proposed activities, a drilling permit will not be granted.48
40. Duesing v. Udall, 350 F.2d 748, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
912 (1966); Learned v. Watt, 528 F. Supp. 980, 981 (D. Wyo. 1980).
41. 30 U.S.C. § 189.
42. 30 U.S.C. § 187; 43 C.F.R. § 3109.2-1 (1985).
43. These include stipulations which: (1) require that the lessee avoid or mitigate
adverse impacts to visual, cultural, and paleontological values; (2) give the government
the authority to control the manner and location of drilling and other activities, and to
control vehicle use (BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
Form 3109-5 (Aug. 1973)); and (3) restrict or prohibit activities that cause erosion or
that adversely impact threatened or endangered species. Id., Form MSO-3100-47(a)
(Feb. 1980). Additional standard stipulations apply to leases of Forest Service lands,
requiring implementation of mitigation and restoration measures, and proven land man-
agement techniques. Id., Form 3109-3 (June 1971).
44. 43 C.F.R. § 3103.1-2.
45. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, OIL AND GAS LEASING: DEEP CREEK
& RESERVOIR NORTH RARE II FURTHER PLANNING AREAS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOR-
EST SERVICE, LEWIS AND CLARK NAT'L FOREST app. B, at 89-90 (Jan. 1, 1981).
46. See generally Edelson, supra note 31.
47. See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1411 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Edelson,
supra note 31, at 940-50.
48. Edelson, supra note 31, at 941-42. With both the Contingent Rights Stipula-
tion and the strict no surface occupancy (NSO) Stipulation, the government maintains
legal authority over surface use of the leased tract, and no vested rights are conveyed.
The difference between the two stipulations is that the NSO Stipulation precludes any
surface use, while under the Contingent Rights Stipulation surface use is possible, but
not guaranteed.
It appears that the Contigent Rights Stipulation has fallen into disuse. When origi-
nally implemented by the government in the early 1980s, the Contingent Rights Stipula-
With NSO leases, the Interior Department retains complete con-
trol over surface occupancy. For non-NSO leases, on the other hand,
the Interior Department cannot deny a drilling permit after issuing
the lease. It may only impose reasonable conditions designed to miti-
gate environmental effects of the drilling operations.4"
After a lease has been issued, the United States Geological Survey
(USGS), an agency within the Interior Department, oversees any oil
and gas operations on the leased tract.50 A lessee must submit an
application for a permit to drill (APD) and an operations plan before
the initiation of drilling.5 1 USGS may require certain site-specific
environmental mitigation measures during the approval process, but
it is not statutorily empowered to block oil and gas operations.52
CASE LAW DISCUSSING NEPA's APPLICATION TO OIL AND GAS
LEASING
The cases discussed below represent the major judicial treatment
of the issue of whether NEPA requires the preparation of an EIS at
the leasing stage of oil and gas activities on public lands.
Sierra Club v. Peterson
The first case squarely addressing the issue of whether an EIS is
required for the issuance of oil and gas leases on public lands was
Sierra Club v. Peterson.53 This case involved a challenge to the deci-
sion of the Forest Service and the Interior Department to issue oil
and gas leases in the Palisades Further Planning Area (Palisades
Area), a roadless area of approximately one quarter-million acres in
the Targhee and Bridger-Teton National Forests of Idaho and
Wyoming. 54
tion was widely criticized. It was attacked by the oil and gas industry because it con-
veyed rights that were uncertain; it was attacked by environmental groups because it
allowed the agency to defer environmental analysis. Perhaps because of this criticism
from both sides, the government's use of the Contingent Rights Stipulation has waned.
For purposes of this Comment, the term "NSO Stipulation" will be used to refer gen-
erally to both of these stipulations, and distinctions between the two types of stipulations
will be made when necessary.
49. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1411.
50. 30 C.F.R. §§ 221-226 (1986).
51. Id. § 221.21(b).
52. Notice to Lessees and Operators of Federal and Indian Onshore Oil and Gas
Leases (NTL-6), 41 Fed. Reg. 18,116-19 (1976).
53. 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
54. Pursuant to the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1982 & Supp. III
1985), the Forest Service is required to undertake a wilderness evaluation of all'the Na-
tional Forest roadless areas, known as a Roadless Area Review and Evaluation. The
latest study, completed in 1979, and referred to as "RARE II," classified the areas stud-
ied as either Wilderness, Non-Wilderness, or Further Planning Areas. Further Planning
Areas are lands requiring additional study before a recommendation can be made on the
ultimate status of those lands. Such lands at some point will be designated either Wilder-
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The Sierra Club argued that the Forest Service had violated
NEPA by recommending the leasing without first preparing an EIS.
The district court upheld the decision to issue the leases without pre-
paring an EIS. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed that decision.55
After conducting an EA, the Forest Service recommended issuing
the leases with various stipulations attached. In addition to standard
stipulations, the leases contained an NSO Stipulation for specific
portions of the Palisades Area designated as "highly environmentally
sensitive." The leases for the remaining lands, which were not con-
sidered highly environmentally sensitive, did not contain NSO Stipu-
lations, and thus did not prohibit surface occupancy.
The Interior Department retained the authority to prohibit all sur-
face-disturbing activity on land leased with the NSO Stipulation un-
til further site-specific environmental studies were made.56 Thus, the
court upheld the issuance of the NSO leases without an EIS. The
court then addressed the issuance, without an EIS, of the non-NSO
leases.
The Forest Service argued that most leases never reach the drill-
ing stage and that any impacts from the act of leasing would be
insignificant or, if significant, could be mitigated by the controls pro-
vided for in the lease stipulations. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit disagreed. It noted that no matter how ex-
tensive the mitigation measures in the leases, none of the stipulations
at issue expressly authorized the Interior Department or the Forest
Service to prevent a lessee from conducting surface-disturbing activi-
ties. Thus, the court concluded that "[t]he decision to allow surface
disturbing activities has been made at the leasing stage and, under
NEPA, this is the point at which the environmental impacts must be
evaluated. 57
One function of NEPA is to facilitate agency consideration of the
environmental effects of various actions while alternatives are still
available.58 The court of appeals in Sierra Club recognized this as-
pect of NEPA: "[T]he appropriate time for preparing an EIS is
ness or Non-Wilderness. A Further Planning Area may be considered for all uses, includ-
ing oil and gas exploration, as long as its potential wilderness quality is preserved. FOR-
EST SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, ROADLESS
AREA REVIEW AND EVALUATION (1979).
55. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d 1409.
56. Id. at 1412.
57. Id. at 1414.
58. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c).
prior to a decision, when the decisionmaker retains a maximum
range of options. . . . An EIS is required when the 'critical agency
decision' is made which results in 'irreversible and irretrievable com-
mitments of resources' to an action which will affect the
environment.
'5 9
The court in Sierra Club gave the Interior Department a choice
with regard to the method by which it could achieve NEPA compli-
ance. The court ordered the Interior Department either to prepare
an EIS prior to leasing, or to include NSO Stipulations in all leases
issued, thus allowing the Interior Department to retain the authority
to prevent surface-disturbing activities should the environmental con-
sequences be found to be unacceptable.60
Conner v. Burford
The next case addressing NEPA's application to oil and gas drill-
ing on public lands was Conner v. Burford.61 The plaintiffs had chal-
lenged the issuance of oil and gas leases in the Flathead and Gallatin
National Forests in Montana. Plaintiffs were granted summary judg-
ment on their claim that the Forest Service and the Interior Depart-
ment violated NEPA by issuing leases without preparing an EIS.
Citing Sierra Club, the district court held the issuance of the non-
NSO leases unlawful. Significantly, the court also held that the NSO
leases violated NEPA.6 2 The case has been appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The district court provided three bases for its decision. First, it
noted that site-specific analysis of a single development activity may
result in a FONSI, without considering the cumulative impacts of
several such activities.6 3 If a comprehensive environmental analysis
was not done prior to any single activity, "a piecemeal invasion of
the forests would occur, followed by the realization of a significant
and irreversible impact."6 4 The court concluded: "In this case, the
59. 717 F.2d at 1414 (emphasis original) (quoting Mobil Corp. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 562 F.2d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 1977)).
60. Id. at 1415.
61. 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985).
62. Id. at 108-09. The latter group of leases contained Contingent Rights
Stipulations.
63. As discussed above, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations
require a consideration of the cumulative impacts of a proposed activity in combination
with other activities. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7). For judicial treatment of the necessity
to analyze cumulative impacts, see, e.g., Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975);
Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974).
64. Conner, 605 F. Supp. at 109. The court cited Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d
754 (9th Cir. 1985), which had stated:
A central purpose of an EIS is to force the consideration of environmental
impacts in the decision making process . . . . [T]he purpose cannot be fully
served if consideration of cumulative effects of successive, interdependent steps
is delayed until the first step has already been taken.
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leasing stage is the first stage of a number of successive steps which
clearly meet the 'significant effect' criterion to trigger an EIS."65
Second, the court stated that NSO stipulations can be modified or
even removed without an EIS, presumably in the same manner as
any other contractual terms may be voluntarily modified by the par-
ties. 6 Thus, the issuance of a lease, even with an NSO Stipulation,
would not guarantee that surface occupancy would not occur.6
7
Third, the court noted that later site-specific analyses might not
take into account the objective of protecting the area for possible
future wilderness designation, 8 as the leased tract apparently was a
Further Planning Area. The court stated: "[T]he promise of a site
specific EIS in the future is meaningless if later analysis cannot con-
sider wilderness preservation as an alternative to development."6
Although there were bases for the court's holding in Conner, the
leased tract's status as a Further Planning Area - and thus as a
potential Wilderness Area - perhaps was the crucial factor in the
court's decision. The court stated: "To use the NSO stipulation as a
mechanism to avoid an EIS when issuing numerous leases on poten-
tial wilderness areas circumvents the spirit of NEPA.' '70 In addition,
the court suggested: "The idea of possible site-specific assessments in
the future does not comply with the objective of protecting the area
for possible wilderness designation."'" Thus, the opinion emphasizes
the importance of preserving wilderness qualities. The above state-
ments also reflect the court's aggressive approach to NEPA review
and its preference for a strict application of NEPA.
Bob Marshall Alliance v. Watt
One year after deciding Connor, the same district court (and
judge) decided Bob Marshall Alliance v. Watt.72 The plaintiffs had
challenged the Interior Department's decision not to prepare an EIS
prior to issuing oil and gas leases in the Deep Creek/Reservoir
North Further Planning Area (Deep Creek Area), a 42,000 acre
area within Montana's Lewis and Clark National Forest. The re-
Id. at 757.
65. Conner, 605 F. Supp. at 108.
66. Id. at 109.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1982)).
69. Conner, 605 F. Supp. at 109 (quoting Block, 690 F.2d at 763).
70. Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20759 (D. Mont. 1986).
mote Deep Creek Area constitutes critical habitat for several endan-
gered and threatened species, and generally contains an abundance
of wildlife. It was given a perfect wilderness attribute rating in the
Forest Service's RARE II evaluation. Because of potential oil and
gas reserves, however, the Deep Creek Area had been designated as
a Further Planning Area, available for all uses (including oil and gas
drilling) permitted under applicable land use plans, provided that the
Area's wilderness quality was preserved. 3
The NEPA issue in Bob Marshall was whether the Deep Creek
leases created a significant effect upon the human environment, thus
requiring preparation of an EIS. 4 The Forest Service had prepared
an EA for the proposal to lease the IPeep Creek Area, and then had
issued a FONSI. The EA recommended allowing surface occupancy
in the Deep Creek Area on slopes less than forty percent in grade,
provided that the leases contained certain restrictive stipulations
which would mitigate, to an extent, the environmental impacts of oil
and gas exploration. The Forest Service determined that individual
site-specific EAs, or perhaps EISs, would be done after site-specific
exploration proposals had been submitted, when the extent of the
lessees' proposed activities would be known. 5
In rejecting the Interior Department's argument that the mitiga-
tion conditions contained in the EA obviated the need for an EIS,76
the district court found that such measures would not totally miti-
gate adverse environmental impacts.1 The court noted that the Deep
Creek Area EA concluded that exploration alone - without com-
mercial development or production - would substantially impair the
wilderness character of the area for a period of up to twenty years.1 8
The court rejected the use of NSO Stipulations as a substitute for
preparing an EIS,79 citing its own decision in Conner, in which it
had rejected NSOs as a substitute for EIS preparation because the
NSOs could be rescinded, cumulative impacts might not be consid-
73. Id. at 20759-60.
74. The case also involved the issue of whether the Forest Service and the De-
partment of the Interior had violated the Endangered Species Act by failing to make an
informed biological assessment of the effects of leasing upon the Deep Creek Area. The
court held in the affirmative. Id.
75. Id. at 20760.
76. The agencies relied on Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak
Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982), in which the agency held that
inclusion in the lease of "[s]pecific mitigation measures which completely compensate for
any possible adverse environmental effects stemming from the original proposal, the stat-
utory threshold of significant environmental effects is not crossed and an EIS is not re-
quired." Id. at 682.
77. Bob Marshall, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20761.
78. Id.
79. NSO Stipulations covered 75% of the leased Deep Creek Area and, unlike the
Contingent Rights Stipulation leases in Sierra Club and Conner, the leases prohibited
surface occupancy of the leased area.
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ered, and a potential wilderness area was threatened. s0 The court in
Bob Marshall did not mention whether or not the NSOs in the Deep
Creek Area leases were similarly rescindable. The court simply con-
cluded: "The NSO stipulations, however, should not be used to cir-
cumvent the requirement of preparing an EIS."' 1 Thus, the court
rejected outright the use of NSOs as a method of complying with
NEPA.
In invalidating the use of NSO stipulations, the court provided a
more detailed NEPA analysis than it did in Conner. First, the court
rejected the propriety of postponing environmental analysis. 82 The
court found that an EIS was required at the leasing stage because
the "critical decision" for the Deep Creek Area was the decision to
issue the leases in the first place. 3 The "critical decision" referred to
by the Bob Marshall court was defined by the Ninth Circuit in Cali-
fornia v. Block as a decision which resulted in an "irreversible and
irretrievable" commitment of resources.8 4 Following Block, the court
held that such a decision requires a thorough environmental analysis
at the time of resource allocation. 5
With regard to multi-stage environmental analysis of leasing, the
Bob Marshall court followed decisions of the Ninth Circuit in deter-
mining that an EIS must address subsequent phases of the same pro-
ject when the "'dependancy [of one phase upon the other] is such
that it would be irrational, or at least unwise to undertake, [sic] the
first phase if subsequent phases were not also undertaken.' "86 The
80. Bob Marshall, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20761 (citing Conner,
605 F. Supp. 107).
81. Id.
82. The agencies had relied on County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562
F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978), to support their position
that a general EIS for leasing was not required. In County of Suffolk, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit stated two factors that determine whether the environ-
mental analysis has been sufficient to comply with NEPA: first, whether obtaining more
detailed information is "meaningfully possible" at the time; second, how "important" it
is to have the additional information at an earlier stage in determining whether or not to
proceed with the project. 562 F.2d at 1378. Applying the two-part analysis articulated in
County of Suffolk, the court in Bob Marshall found that it was both meaningfully possi-
ble and important to discover the site-specific environmental consequences of leasing in
the Deep Creek Area before the agency makes the decision to lease. 16 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20761.
83. Bob Marshall, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20761 (citing Block, 690
F.2d 753, which held that the Forest Service had violated NEPA by designating certain
roadless areas under RARE II as Non-Wilderness without sufficient site-specific
analysis).
84. Block, 690 F.2d at 763.
85. Id. See Bob Marshall, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20761.
86. 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20761 (quoting Thomas, 753 F.2d at
court noted that lease issuance is the first step in a process involving
substantial investment by the lessee, and that a lessee's capital in-
vestments and contractual commitments are relevant to determining
the interdependence of phased activities.87 In the court's analysis,
"[i]t would undoubtedly be irrational, or at least unwise to under-
take a leasing program, if exploration and ultimate development
were not only contemplated but possible."88 Thus, since lease issu-
ance in reality is the first step in a process which may "significantly
affect" the environment, the court required an EIS before the project
proceeded.
Second, in rejecting the adequacy of NSO Stipulations as a substi-
tute for EIS preparation at the leasing stage, the court addressed the
issue of the cumulative effects of several oil and gas projects. The
court noted that such cumulative effects would be significantly dif-
ferent from those of a single operation within the Deep Creek Area,
and concluded by quoting from Conner: "'Obviously a comprehen-
sive analysis of cumulative impacts of several oil and gas develop-
ment activities must be done before a single activity can proceed.' "89
The court noted that in determining whether an action significantly
affects the environment, the CEQ regulations provide that a factor in
determining cumulative impacts is "[w]hether the action is related
to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively sig-
nificant impacts. Significance exists if it is reasonable to anticipate a
cumulatively significant impact on the environment. Significance
cannot be avoided by . ..breaking [an action] down into small
component parts."90 The court asserted that this rule complements
the "unassailed principle" that an EIS should be prepared early in
the planning process so that environmental impacts would be consid-
ered in decision-making. 91
The final NEPA issue addressed by the court was the NEPA re-
quirement that the agency set forth alternatives to the proposed ac-
759, in turn quoting Trout Unlimited,-509 F.2d at 1285. In Thomas, the court held that
the road construction was a connected action with the timber sales and, thus, must be
studied in a single EIS. 753 F.2d at 760-61. In Trout Unlimited, the court held that the
EIS was not required for a Second Phase of a Dam and Reservior Project if the First
Phase is substantially independent of the Second Phase. 509 F.2d at 1285).
87. Bob Marshall, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20761 (citing Cady, 527
F.2d 786, in which the court held that a lessee's capital investments and contractual
commitments are relevant to a determination of the interdependence of staged activities.
Id. at 795).
88. Bob Marshall, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20761 (quoting Conner,
605 F. Supp. at 109).
89. 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20761.
90. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7).
91. Bob Marshall, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20762. For a discussion
of NEPA's policy of early application of the environmental analysis process, see infra
notes 161-170 and accompanying text.
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tion.92 Plaintiffs argued that the Interior Department had failed to
consider the alternative of denying all lease applications in order to
preserve the Deep Creek Area for possible future wilderness designa-
tion by Congress. The Interior Department responded that it had
considered this alternative, but had rejected it because the EA did
not find "unavoidable conflicts" between surface use and resource
preservation which it believed were required in order to reject any
lease.93
The court ruled that the Interior Department could indeed base a
decision to reject leases solely on the protection of wilderness charac-
teristics. The court emphasized the importance of the alternatives
analysis, noting that this requirement appeared twice in the text of
NEPA, once more than the EIS requirement itself. The court gave
special emphasis to the alternatives requirement in the context of
possible adverse impacts to a potential future Wilderness Area. The
court stated: "The analysis of the wilderness preservation/no leasing
alternative is necessary at a time when that alternative is still viable,
a time which is limited to the pre-leasing stage." 94 Thus, the court
held that the mere listing of the no-leasing alternative, without any
meaningful consideration, violated NEPA.95
Park County Resource Council v. United States Department of
Agriculture
In 1987, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in
Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Department of
Agriculture,98 which cut against the legal principles established in
Sierra Club, Conner, and Bob Marshall.97 The Park County case
involved a NEPA challenge by the Park County Resource Council to
the issuance of an oil and gas lease in the Shoshone and other Na-
tional Forests in the Rocky Moutain Region. After preparing an EA,
the Forest Service issued a FONSI and recommended issuing a lease
containing stipulations which would "in most cases, prevent or satis-
92. See supra notes 7 & 13-15 and accompanying text.
93. Bob Marshall, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20762. The Interior De-
partment apparently had relied on the Forest Service Manual for this conclusion. Cur-
rent policy, as reflected in sections 2822.14b and 2822.46 of the Forest Service Manual,
required decisions to reject leases to be based on a finding of such "unavoidable
conflicts."
94. Bob Marshall, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20762.
95. Id.
96. 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987).
97. See Sierra Club, 717 F.2d 1409; Conner, 605 F. Supp. 107; Bob Marshall, 16
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20759.
factorily mitigate unacceptable environmental impacts."' 8 Following
the recommendation of the Forest Service, the Interior Department
issued an oil and gas lease which encompassed 10,174 acres of non-
wilderness, multiple-use land in the Shoshone National Forest. The
lease required prior approval, as well as preparation of additional
EAs, before any surface-disturbing actions, such as exploratory drill-
ing, would be permitted. The lease, however, did not contain NSO
Stipulations,"9 except for one provision that allowed the Forest Ser-
vice to prohibit any ground-disturbing activity which would harm
any threatened or endangered species inhabiting the lands.100
There were several important aspects to the Park County case,
each discussed below. First, the plaintiffs alleged that the lease issu-
ance violated NEPA because it was a "major federal action which
significantly affects the quality of the human environment and
thereby requires the preparation of an EIS."'0' Plaintiffs sought
rescision of the lease, as well as an order requiring the Interior De-
partment to withdraw approval of any leases or permits previously
granted, pending compliance with NEPA. °2 The District Court de-
nied plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order and a pre-
liminary injunction, and dismissed their complaint on the merits. 0 3
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Forest
Service determination that an EIS was not required for lease issu-
ance was not unreasonable.104 Although reversing the district court
98. Park County Resource Council v. United States Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d at
612.
99. NORTH FORK WELL FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, BUREAU
OF LAND MANAGEMENT [&] U.S. FOREST SERVICE, SHOSHONE NAT'L FOREST 93-94
(Mar. 1985) [hereinafter NORTH FORK WELL EIS]. The lease is reprinted in its entirety
in the NORTH FORK WELL EIS.
100. Id. at 94. The latter provision is analyzed in greater detail infra, notes 125-
130.
101. Park County, 817 F.2d at 614.
102. Id.
103. Park County, 613 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Wyo. 1985).
104. Park County, 817 F.2d at 624. The appeals court in Park County applied a
"reasonableness" standard of review. Id. at 621-24. As the court noted, a split exists
among the circuits as to the appropriate standard of review of an agency decision not to
prepare an EIS. Id. at 621 n.4. The Tenth Circuit, along with the Third, Fifth, Eight,
and Ninth Circuits, has applied a "reasonableness" standard of review. See, e.g., Jones v.
Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1986); Vieux Carre Property Owners, Residents &
Assoc., Inc. v. Pierce, 719 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1983); Township of Lower Alloways
Creek v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732, 742 (3d Cir. 1982); Winnebago
Tribe v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980).
The First, Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, have applied the
"arbitrary or capricious" standard of review contained in the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). See, e.g., City of Alexandria v. Federal Highway
Admin., 756 F.2d 1014, 1017 (4th Cir. 1985); City of West Chicago v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 701 F.2d 632, 651 (7th Cir. 1983); Grazing Fields Farm
v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1072 (1st Cir. 1980); Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v.
United States, 573 F.2d 725, 732 (2d Cir. 1978).
The United States Supreme Court has declined to resolve this issue, despite the urg-
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on several procedural issues,10 the appeals court upheld the district
court on the merits of the case - the NEPA issues.
Second, in addition to challenging the issuance of the lease, the
plaintiffs also challenged the Interior Department's approval of an
APD. The permit allowed the lessee's operator to drill an exploratory
well in the leased area. 106 Plaintiffs challenged the APD approval on
the ground that the EIS accompanying the drilling permit was inad-
equate. The district court held that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate any inadequacy of the EIS accompanying the permit.
Before the case reached the Tenth Circuit, the exploratory well
had been drilled and found to be dry, and reclamation work at the
site had been completed. Thus, the circuit court dismissed as moot
plaintiff's challenge to the APD approval.10 7 Because the lease for
the tract remained in force, 08 however, the challenge to the lease
ings of Justice White in several recent dissents from denial of certiorari. See Gee v.
Boyd, 471 U.S. 1058 (1985) (White, Brennan, and Marshall, J.J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); River Road Alliance v. Corps of Engineers, 106 U.S. 1283 (1986) (White,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Justice White has argued in his dissents that there is a real difference between the two
standards of review. This view holds that courts applying the "arbitrary or capricious"
standard emphasize agency discretion, while courts applying the "reasonableness" stan-
dard tend to scrutinize more closely, and perhaps more substantively, the agency
decision.
Regarding judicial review of agency decisions to forego EIS preparation, Professor
Kenneth Davis has asserted that any difference between the standards of "reasonable-
ness" and "arbitrary or capricious" is semantic because both standards effectuate the
same degree of review. This view holds that, if an administrator acts unreasonably, he or
she is at the same time acting arbitrarily or capriciously, and vice versa. Interview with
Kenneth C. Davis, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law, in San
Diego (Apr. 17, 1987). Moreover, courts generally apply an overall reasonableness analy-
sis in reviewing agency decisions, no matter what standard of review is professed. See 5
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:1 (2d ed. 1984).
As the above discussion suggests, the division of opinion regarding the standard of
review of an agency decision not to prepare an EIS under NEPA is part of a broader
debate in administrative law, and is beyond the scope of this Comment.
105. First, the plaintiffs' NEPA claim was not barred by the 90 day statute of
limitations contained in the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 226-2. Park
County, 817 F.2d at 616. Second, the plaintiffs' claim was not barred by the defense of
laches. Id. at 617-18. Third, plaintiffs' claim was not barred for failure to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies. Id. at 19-20. The district court had decided the case upon these three
procedural grounds and had then, "in an abundance of caution," in the words of the
appeals court, gone on to hold that plaintiffs' claim failed on the merits as well. Id. at
614.
106. Plaintiffs had first appealed the approval of the application for a permit to
drill (APD) to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). While the IBLA decision
was pending, plaintiffs filed their action, which included the APD challenge, in the dis-
trict court.
107. Park County, 817 F.2d at 614-15.
108. The operator also had announced that it possibly would seek another APD for
issuance, unlike the APD challenge, was not mooted by these
developments. 09
Third, the Park County court addressed the issue of whether the
Forest Service should have prepared an EIS in order to assess poten-
tial cumulative effects of the lease issuance. In an argument identical
to that made by the plaintiff and accepted by the court in Bob Mar-
shall, the Park County plaintiffs argued that leasing was the first
step in a foreseeable process including exploratory drilling and then
full field development. The cumulative effects of these events, they
argued, should be considered at the leasing stage, at a time when it
is still possible to consider these effects before they occur.110
The court rejected this argument, ruling that the link between
leasing and development was unlikely to occur and could not be spe-
cifically described at the leasing stage. The court stated: "Full field
development is typically an extremely tentative possibility at best at
the leasing stage." '' The court concluded that the steps from leas-
ing to development are not "'so interdependent that it would be un-
wise or irrational to complete one without the others' - the bench-
mark signaling the need for a cumulative impact EIS." 12
Finally, the Park County court analyzed the tiered approach to
environmental review, which is discussed in the CEQ regulations. 3
The court stated that, at the leasing stage, the agency does not have
the specific information necessary to make a useful environmental
evaluation, and that it would only have this information when it re-
ceived a concrete proposal, in the form of an APD. 14 Thus, the
court concluded, a tiered review was appropriate in this case.
A PERSPECTIVE ON THE CASES
Oil and gas exploration often constitutes, and development almost
always constitutes, a "major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment." In determining whether a lease
issuance also constitutes such an action, much depends on whether
the lease vests authority in the government to prohibit drilling (or to
condition drilling on preparation of an EIS), judicial interpretation
of these stipulations, and the specific facts of the case. The following
discussion of the cases emphasizes the important distinction between
non-NSO and NSO leases.
an additional well in the area. Id. at 615.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 622-24.
111. Id. at 623.
112. Id. (quoting Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1285).
113. Id. at 624; see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.20, 1508.28. For a detailed analysis of
tiered review, see infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
114. Park County, 817 F.2d at 624.
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Non-NSO Leases
With regard to non-NSO leases, the recent Park County decision
contradicts Sierra Club, as well as the more stringent decisions in
Conner and Bob Marshall. The Park County court held that the
agency did not violate NEPA by issuing an oil and gas lease without
preparing an EIS."15 The lease limited the manner in which drilling
could be conducted, but did not grant the government authority to
prohibit drilling in order to prevent adverse surface effects, except in
the case of adverse impacts of threatened or endangered wildlife." 6
Non-NSO leases grant the lessee a vested right to drill on the
leased tract. The government may regulate how drilling may proceed
(i.e., by conditions in the drilling permit, and by non-NSO Stipula-
tions in the lease) but the government has surrendered the authority
to decide whether to allow drilling. Even if an EIS prepared at a
subsequent stage determines severe adverse impacts, the government
may not prohibit the lessee's surface operations at that point. For
these reasons, failure to prepare an EIS for issuance of non-NSO
leases clearly violates NEPA. In holding to the contrary, without es-
tablishing that drilling under this lease would not significantly affect
the environment, the Park County decision reflects a fundamentally
erroneous interpretation of the law.
NSO Leases
NSO leases, on the other hand, do not convey vested surface occu-
pancy rights. NSO leases merely convey rights to mineral deposits
without rights to surface occupancy (through strict NSO Stipula-
tions), or rights to surface occupancy which are contingent upon
agency evaluation and approval of a particular site-specific proposal
(through Contingent Rights Stipulations).
In addition to the nature of the leases and the NEPA policy inter-
pretations made by the courts, the case holdings seem to depend on
two factual aspects: first, whether the land at issue contains wilder-
ness qualities that may be affected by leasing; and second, whether it
is known if oil or gas actually exists in commercially producible
quantities on the leased tract.
Regarding the first factor, the courts in Sierra Club, and espe-
cially in Conner and Bob Marshall, emphasized the potential effects
of leasing on the wilderness qualities of the lands, which were all
115. Id. at 622-24.
116. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
Further Planning Areas. In Park County, the court stressed the lack
of wilderness qualities contained in the leased tract. 17 Moreover, the
mitigation measures involved were extensive." 8
The second consideration in evaluating these cases is that in Park
County, unlike the other cases, the court knew that no oil or gas
existed in the ground, at least in the area of the dry exploratory hole.
Because the possibility of an oil or gas discovery in the area was
remote, it would be unlikely that leasing would lead to significant
environmental effects.
The importance of the second factor distinguishing the two lines of
cases - whether there are known oil or gas reserves - reflects a
broader dichotomy in the law regarding NEPA and oil and gas leas-
ing. On the one hand, Sierra Club, Conner, and Bob Marshall re-
present the view that whether an EIS is required for leasing depends
on the scope of the rights conveyed to the lessee. To the extent that
the full exercise of those rights requires an EIS, an EIS must be
prepared upon conveyance of those rights.
On the other hand, Park County represents the view that whether
an EIS is required depends on the likelihood of finding oil or gas,
and whether the land is potential wilderness or not - in short, the
perceived likelihood of significant environmental impact. This also is
the position of the BLM generally. In theory it reflects a policy of
staged leasing; in reality, however, EISs rarely are prepared at sub-
sequent stages.
Although NSO leasing appears to be a sound administrative
method of complying with NEPA, its violation of the spirit and poli-
cies written into NEPA raises serious problems. The remainder of
this Comment analyzes the Park County decision, and discusses rele-
vant legal and policy aspects of oil and gas leasing in the NEPA
context. It suggests that, while the Conner and Bob Marshall deci-
sions are better reasoned than the Park County decision, and effec-
tuate a strong NEPA policy, as Congress intended, the two lines of
cases are significantly different on their facts. Thus a direct compari-
son is not fruitful; nor perhaps is a generic discussion of whether
117. The Park County court stated:
The lease area has never been designated a wilderness, wilderness study, park,
or other restricted-use area. The district court noted: "Congress has had three
chances in recent years to incorporate these lands into a Wilderness Area, but
each time has refused to do so, including in 1984 when the lands in question
were once again classified as multiple-use areas in the Wyoming Wilderness
Act ... [M]ultiple-use does include oil and gas drilling."
613 F. Supp. at 1187.
118. The lessee conducted exploratory oil and gas drilling using the only available
drilling rig in North America that could be disassembled and flown to the drilling site by
helicopter, thus drastically reducing surface disturbance from road construction. Mc-
Crum, NEPA Litigation Affecting Federal Mineral Leasing and Development, 2 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 7, 10 (Spring 1986).
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NSO leasing violates NEPA. The Comment concludes that Conner
and Bob Marshall should be affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE Park County DECIsION
Relation to Prior Case Law
Prior to its analysis of the merits of the case, the circuit court in
Park County stated: "We do not approach this issue with a clean
slate. A well-developed body of case law under NEPA, as well as
considerations of public policy, must guide our analysis." 119 The
slate was nonetheless "cleaner" than it reasonably should have been.
The court failed to mention or even cite Sierra Club, Conner, or Bob
Marshall.120 Two of the three cases (Conner and Bob Marshall) are
district court cases, to which circuit courts owe no deference; these
two cases, however, along with Sierra Club, are the only cases di-
rectly on point regarding the specific issue before the court in Park
County. Although courts are in no way bound to acknowledge case
law from other circuits, the court's omissions of relevant law in Park
County suggest that perhaps the "well-developed body of case law
under NEPA" was overshadowed by the court's own "considerations
of public policy."
Comparative Stipulations Analysis
The real problem, of course, is not simply that the Park County
decision did not cite all the applicable case law available, but that it
failed to address the issue of whether, and under what circum-
stances, stipulations in oil and gas leases will obviate NEPA's EIS
requirement. The Park County court failed to resolve important
questions about the effect of the lease stipulations, and about the
effect of NSO Stipulations generally, 'even though it changed the
tenor, if not the direction, of the law in this area.
119. Park County, 817 F.2d at 620.
120. A note should be made with regard to the timing of these cases. Appellants'
brief in Park County was filed on December 19, 1985, and the decision was issued in the
case on April 17, 1987. The Bob Marshall decision was issued on May 27, 1986. It is not
known whether Bob Marshall was issued in sufficient time for the Park County court to
be able to address it, whether the Park County court was unaware of the decision, or
whether that court simply was disinclined to address it.
In addition, it should be noted that appellants' brief in Park County did not include
reference to Sierra Club. It did include, however, reference to Conner, which does dis-
cuss Sierra Club. Appellants' Opening Brief at 17, Park County Resource Council v.
United States Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1985) (No. 85-1000) [hereinafter
Opening Brief].
The lease issued by the Interior Department in Park County con-
tained, among other mitigation provisions,12 a stipulation requiring
"prior approval, as well as the preparation of further EAs, before
any surface disturbing actions, such as drilling [occur]."22 The
court did not mention that this stipulation does not provide the Inte-
rior Department with the legal authority to prohibit the regulated
activities in order to prevent adverse impacts discovered upon site-
specific analysis.'2 3 The stipulation does not have the same effect as
the NSO stipulations in Sierra Club, Conner, and Bob Marshall.24
The stipulations in Park County gave the government the authority
to limit drilling but not to prohibit it, except where surface occu-
pancy is found to pose harm to any threatened or endangered species
on the tract.
The court's treatment of the legal effects of the lease obscures
rather than clarifies these effects. However, the EIS for the approved
exploratory well succinctly defines these effects in its discussion of
the lease: "Under the existing lease [the] alternative [of not drilling
the well] would be authorized only if occupancy would detrimentally
affect any endangered or threatened plant or animal species."' 26 The
EIS also states: "[T]he Secretary of Interior has no authority to
deny all activity upon the lease except. . . where use and occupancy
would detrimentally affect endangered or threatened species." 26
The exception referred to in the exploratory well EIS was the
lease stipulation which provided that prior to surface-disturbing ac-
tivities, the leased lands must be surveyed for any threatened or en-
dangered plant or animal species, and a report filed describing the
results of the survey, "possibly resulting in use restrictions or even
complete use prohibition."'27 Thus, the operator potentially could be
precluded from drilling activities if such activities jeopardized a
threatened or endangered species. However, the threatened or endan-
gered species stipulation does not purport to vest the government
with authority to prevent other kinds of environmental harm.
121. Among other things, the lessee was required to "take all reasonable steps to
prevent unnecessary soil erosion or timber damage, unnecessary air and water pollution,
and unnecessary damage of surface improvements, fossils and artifacts and to restore the
land surface to its former condition after use is terminated." Id. at 4-5 (quoting NORTH
FORK WELL EIS, supra note 99, at 91, 93).
122. Id. at 17 (quoting NORTH FORK WELL EIS, supra note 99, at 93-94).
123. See generally NORTH FORK WELL EIS, LEASE W-73230, supra note 99, at
89-94.
124. Even in Conner and Bob Marshall, which held that the NSO Stipulations did
not save the lease issuance from violating NEPA, the court recognized that the stipula-
tions, at least when originally issued with the leases, prohibited surface disturbance with-
out additional permission from the government. Conner, 605 F. Supp. 107; Bob Mar-
shall, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20759.
125. NORTH FORK WEL EIS, supra note 99, at 3.
126. Id. at 19.
127. Park County, 817 F.2d at 613 (emphasis added).
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The court explicitly recognized the NSO nature of the
threatened/endangered species stipulation,128 but failed to discuss
the non-NSO nature of the remaining stipulations. 12 9 Nor did the
court address the distinction between the two types of stipulations.
The failure of the appellants' brief to adequately present this issue to
the court1 30 is unfortunate. The court's failure to address this issue is
more unfortunate, because the decision is internally inconsistent and
obfuscates the law regarding oil and gas leases.
Cumulative Effects
The Park County court's conclusion with regard to potential cu-
mulative effects of lease issuance is problematic in two respects.
First, the court based its conclusion on the statistical probability of a
lease issuance leading to field development. The court stated that
since development occurs on only one percent of the lands leased, the
relation between leasing and development was not so interdependent
as to require an EIS. 31
A purely statistical basis for such decisions seems inconsistent
with NEPA's requirement that an EIS be prepared where significant
impacts may occur.13 2 Without challenging the validity of the num-
bers cited by the court, it should be noted that those numbers re-
present a general average, and that the statistical argument does not
reflect the very real possibility of exploratory drilling, and develop-
ment, in a particular case.
The CEQ regulations provide that an agency, in determining the
scope of an EIS, must consider cumulative impacts. 33 The regula-
tions define a cumulative impact as "the impact on the environment
which results from the incremental impact of the action when added
to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future ac-
tions. ... ,4 Leasing is designed to facilitate exploration and de-
velopment.'3 5 Therefore, exploration and development must be con-
sidered "reasonably foreseeable future actions" connected with
128. Id. This was a Contingent Rights Stipulation.
129. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
130. See generally Opening Brief, supra note 120.
131. Park County, 817 F.2d at 623. The court conceded that "the region-wide
ramifications of development will need to be considered at some point." If an APD were
filed, for example, this may require an EIS considering cumulative effects in light of
regional development, as well as site-specific effects. Id. at 623.
132. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
133. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(c).
134. Id. § 1508.7 (emphasis added).
135. See generally The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287.
leasing. Thus, leasing combined with the incremental impacts of ex-
ploration and development constitutes a cumulative impact under the
CEQ regulations." 8'
In addition, in establishing "significance" for the purpose of deter-
mining whether an EIS is required, the CEQ regulations provide:
"Significance exists if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively
significant impact on the environment. 131 Failure to prepare an EIS
which discusses these cumulative effects thus constitutes a violation
of NEPA.
The second problem regarding the court's conclusion that an EIS
analyzing cumulative impacts is unnecessary is more central to the
focus of this Comment. The court's statement that an APD may re-
quire a cumulative impact EIS only where other regional develop-
ment has occurred 138 precludes consideration of cumulative impacts
of development before such development occurs.139 An EIS after the
impact has occurred has no value to the decisionmaker. If the point
at which the agency relinquishes control over the land is the lease
issuance, after which it cannot prohibit drilling, then an EIS discuss-
ing cumulative effects prepared after lease issuance may be of no
effect. The cumulative effects of several projects, or of several as-
pects of a single project, may be accurately realized, but this is all
for naught if surface occupancy cannot be prohibited.
Tiered Environmental Analysis
The Park County court also may have muddied the waters regard-
ing the "tiering" of environmental analysis. The CEQ regulations
define "tiering" as "the coverage of general matters in broader envi-
ronmental impact statements (such as national program or policy
statements) with subsequently narrower statements or environmental
analyses (such as regional or basinwide program statements or ulti-
mately site-specific statements) incorporating by reference the gen-
eral discussions and concentrating solely on the issues specific to the
statement subsequently prepared."'"4
The regulations encourage tiering "to eliminate repetitious discus-
sion of the same issues and to focus on the issues ripe for decision at
each level of environmental review.' 4' The regulations also state the
136. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(c). This impact must be considered in an EIS, pursuant
to section 1508.25(c) of those regulations.
137. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7). See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
138. See Park County, 817 F.2d 609.
139. See, e.g., Bob Marshall, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20759. See supra
text accompanying notes 89-91.
140. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28.
141. Id. § 1502.20.
Whenever a broad environmental impact statement has been prepared (such as
a program or policy statement) and a subsequent statement or environmental
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functions of tiering as being "to relate broad and narrow actions and
to avoid duplication and delay."'
42
The Park County court stated that tiering "is calculated to pro-
vide the most informed decision making possible in oil and gas leas-
ing."143 Whether or not this statement is accurate is not clear. The
CEQ regulations provide that tiering is designed to bring about effi-
cient decisionmaking, 144  but not specifically informed
decisionmaking.
The court's questionable characterization of the underlying policy
of tiering is consistent with its subsequent mischaracterization of the
tiering process. The court went on to conclude its discussion of tier-
ing by stating: "[T]he specificity that NEPA requires [to prepare an
EIS] is simply not possible [at the leasing stage,] absent concrete
proposals. 14 Yet, the tiering concept, cited by the court, does not
support this conclusion. The court used the tiering concept to justify
postponing a thorough environmental analysis until more informa-
tion is available on site-specific proposals. However, simply because
tiering contemplates a progression of environmental analyses moving
from the broad and general to the narrow and specific, this general
administrative mechanism does not support the notion that a mean-
ingful EIS cannot be prepared at the leasing stage.1 46
In California v. Block, 47 the Ninth Circuit considered the ade-
assessment is then prepared or on action included within the entire program or
policy (such as a site-specific action) the subsequent statement or environmen-
tal assessment need only summarize the issues discussed in the broader state-
ment by reference and shall concentrate on the issues specific to the subsequent
action.
Id.
142. Id. § 1502.4(d).
143. Park County, 817 F.2d at 624 (emphasis added).
144. See 40 C.RR. §§ 1502.4, 1502.20.
145. Park County, 817 F.2d at 624.
146. The tiering contemplated by NEPA would provide that if a broad oil and gas
leasing policy regarding certain tracts of land has been approved, then the evaluation,
whether in the form of an EA or an EIS, of subsequent issuance of a specific lease may
summarize or incorporate by reference portions of the analysis of the broader action (i.e.,
the approval of the general leasing policy). The regulations so provide, not because less
analysis is needed for the subsequent action, but to the contrary, so that the agency may"concentrate on the issues specific to the subsequent action." Block, 690 F.2d at 753.
Alternatively, one might consider the specific lease issuance to be the broader action,
and approval of the APD as the subsequent narrower action encompassed within the
lease issuance. The environmental analysis, most likely in the form of an EIS, need not
repeat materials dealt with at length in the analysis prepared for the lease issuance.
Again, this hardly supports the proposition that a meaningful EIS cannot be prepared at
the time of lease issuance but only upon submission of an APD.
147. 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
quacy of the EIS prepared by the Forest Service in connection with
its decision to designate forty-seven roadless areas in California as
nonwilderness. The Forest Service contended that a programmatic
EIS describing the first step in a multi-step national project need not
contain the type of detailed site-specific information normally con-
tained in an EIS prepared for a more narrowly focused project, such
as a dam or a federal mineral lease."48 In affirming the district court,
the court held the EIS to be inadequate, stating: "The 'critical deci-
sion' to commit these areas for nonwilderness uses . . . is 'irrever-
sable and irretrievable.' The site-specific impact . . . must therefore
be carefully scrutinized now and not when specific development pro-
posals are made."14
Significantly, the court in Block conceded that "conducting a de-
tailed site-specific analysis of the . . . decision will be no simple task
and will be laden with empirical uncertainty." S0 The court went on
to conclude: "Having decided to allocate simultaneously millions of
acres of land to nonwilderness use, the Forest Service may not rely
upon forecasting difficulties or the task's magnitude to excuse the
absence of a reasonably thorough site-specific analysis of the deci-
sion's environmental consequences."'5' The Park County decision,
on the other hand, condoned the idea that an EIS need not be pre-
pared if that task is a difficult one.
THE SUBSTANCE-PROCEDURE CONUNDRUM OF NEPA
For leases which convey vested drilling rights, lease issuance is the
stage at which NEPA's EIS requirement should be triggered, except
in extraordinary (i.e., non-significant impact) cases. For leases which
do not convey drilling rights, or which convey contingent rights, the
EIS requirement may or may not be triggered at some later point.
This legal question probably cannot be answered adequately in the
abstract, and certainly cannot be answered without analyzing the ex-
tent to which the agency or reviewing court emphasizes the substan-
tive policies of NEPA.
NEPA primarily is a procedural statute, as the court in Park
County noted.152 NEPA and the accompanying CEQ regulations im-
pose procedural requirements on the agency but do not replace the
substantive decisionmaking which the agency must undertake.153
148. Id. at 760-61.
149. Id. at 763.
150. Id. at 765.
151. Id. at 753 (emphasis added).
152. Park County, 817 F.2d at 620. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
153. This becomes evident by looking at some of the major provisions of the stat-
ute and the regulations. For example, the agency must determine what constitutes a "sig-
nificant" impact under 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c), and at what point the action or proposal
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The CEQ regulations state: "The NEPA process is intended to
help public officials make decisions that are based on understanding
of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore
and enhance the environment." '54 Thus, while NEPA and the CEQ
regulations facilitate considered environmental decisionmaking, they
do not substitute for the substantive judgments and decisionmaking
by the responsible public officials.
On the other hand, NEPA embraces an environmental mandate
which has been given strict enforcement by the courts.15 5 NEPA di-
rects federal agencies to consider "to the fullest extent possible" the
environmental effects of their policies, regulations, and actions.156
The Supreme Court has noted that this charge is "neither accidental
nor hyperbolic."1 57 NEPA's EIS requirement is an "action forcing"
provision.' 58 It imposes a duty upon federal agencies to effectuate the
purposes of the statute to the fullest degree possible.
159
Thus, while the agency has wide discretion under NEPA, at some
point - presumably at the point of "unreasonableness" or "arbitrar-
iness"160 - courts must overturn an agency decision not to prepare
an EIS.
POLICY ANALYSIS OF NSO LEASING
A comparison of the treatment of non-NSO Stipulations in Sierra
Club and Park County, and of NSO Stipulations in Bob Marshall
and Park County, suggests that the legal requirements of NEPA
procedure in relation to oil and gas leasing are not universally clear.
As noted above, NEPA's procedural requirements leave much room
should be considered "cumulative" or "connected" with regard to other actions or pro-
posals, pursuant to the CEQ regulations. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517.
In addition, actions coming under the purview of NEPA need only "include" an EIS.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). The agency has discretion to formulate, within reason, the conclu-
sions contained in the EIS and the resulting course of action chosen. Moreover, agencies
must "study, develop, and describe" appropriate alternatives to proposed actions involv-
ing conflicts among resource uses. Id. § 4332(E). There is no requirement, however, that
agencies resolve such conflicts, and the agency has fairly wide discretion in reaching a
conclusion regarding the alternatives based on the agency's description of them.
154. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(C).
155. See Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
582 F.2d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1978).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (emphasis added).
157. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 787 (1976).
158. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976).
159. Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 582 F.2d at 81; 115 CONG. REc. 40,416, 40,419
(1969).
160. See Park County, 817 F.2d 609.
for substantive agency decisionmaking. The legal analysis thus shifts
into policy analysis, which becomes determinative.
NEPA's Policy of Early Environmental Analysis
One of the strongest policies written into the NEPA process is the
provision in the CEQ regulations which requires an early application
of NEPA procedures.161 Agencies must "integrate the NEPA pro-
cess with other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that
planning and decisions reflect environmental values, to avoid delays
later in the process, and to head off potential conflicts."162 Moreover,
environmental analysis must "be prepared early enough so that it
can serve practically as an important contribution to the decision-
"1163making process ....
The early application policy is especially relevant to a discussion
of oil and gas leasing, since the heart of the issue is the timing of
EIS preparation for oil and gas activities. The proposition that an
EIS need not be prepared in connection with issuance of an NSO
lease is called into question when one considers the "early applica-
tion" policy specifically incorporated into the NEPA process. Al-
though the issue exists within a grey area of the law, analysis of the
"early application" policy is a necessary predicate to a well-rea-
soned, statutorily honest resolution of the issue.
The court in Block recognized the early environmental analysis
mandate of NEPA. In that case, the court rejected the agency's fail-
ure to prepare an EIS based on the "task's magnitude." 6 The court
also noted that NEPA requires that the evaluation of a project's en-
vironmental consequences take place at an early stage in the pro-
ject's planning process .1 6 The court conceded the desirability of "de-
fer[ring] detailed analysis until a concrete development proposal
crystallizes the dimensions of a project's environmental conse-
quences." 66 The court noted, however, that a site-specific EIS must
be done when the "critical decision" has been made to act 6n site
development.'6 1 This point is reached when, "as a practical matter,
the agency proposes to make an 'irreversible and irretrievable' com-
mitment of the availability of resources' to a project at a particular
site."168
161. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.5(a), 1501.2, 1502.5, 1508.13.
162. Id. § 1501.2.
163. Id. § 1502.5.
164. Id. at 765.
165. Id. at 761. See also Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 327 (9th
Cir. 1975).
166. Block, 690 F.2d at 761 (citing Kleppe, 47 U.S. at 402).
167. Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1978)).
168. Id. (emphasis added).
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Given the problems associated with NSO Stipulations, 69 this"critical decision" may occur, "as a practical matter," at the leasing
stage.
The Economics of EIS Preparation in Connection with Oil and
Gas Leasing
The Park County case raises the issue of the cost of preparing an
EIS as a practical factor in judicial review of a decision to forego
preparation of an EIS. The court made two main points in this re-
gard. First, it noted that, during 1984, the federal government issued
5,478 oil and gas leases. During the same year, the entire Depart-
ment of Interior, including agencies outside the areas of oil and gas,
prepared only 115 EISs - a figure amounting to approximately two
percent of the EISs that would be required if an EIS were required
to be prepared for every oil and gas lease issued.7 0 Second, in a
related point, the court noted that requiring an EIS at the leasing
stage, absent site-specific data, necessarily would result in prepara-
tion of a "boilerplate" EIS which would be of little use to the agency
decisionmaker. 
7 1
Using the two percent figure, the Park County court leaves the
horrifying impression that if an EIS were required for every oil and
gas lease issued, the Interior Department would have to increase the
number of EISs prepared by ninety-eight percent! The court's use of
statistics is misleading, however. Since many leases often are issued
for a single tract of land, a single EIS often is prepared for the entire
leased tract. Agencies need not, nor do they in practice, prepare a
separate EIS for every single lease issued.
Moreover, under a reasonable policy towards oil and gas leasing,
the exaggerated scenario suggested by the court would not be the
case. One aspect of a reasonable policy, and one which also would
lower the cost of EIS preparation, is that leases would be issued at a
slower pace than in recent years. There would be fewer leases issued
in a given year, saving time and money expended by the agency.
This would also increase the chances that those leases which are is-
sued would be evaluated more carefully and processed more quickly.
The second aspect of a reasonable leasing policy would be to in-
crease the fees to lessees to help cover the costs of EIS preparation
169. See infra text accompanying notes 182-89.
170. Park County, 817 F.2d at 623.
171. Id. at 624.
for their lease.17 2 Lessees are receiving a sophisticated and special-
ized government service for the opportunity to make great profits
from public lands, at the risk of spoiling those lands. Thus, this is
not an unfair type of fee, and courts have upheld such fees in similar
cases. 173 Moreover, increasing the up-front costs of lease acquisition
may be more desirable to the lessee than granting Contingent Rights
Stipulation leases, and allowing the lessee to spend large amounts of
money on preliminary exploration, and then perhaps preventing him
or her from drilling or developing because a subsequent site-specific
EIS has revealed an adverse impact.1 4
Requiring an EIS up front on NSO leases makes for better NEPA
policy, as well as cost-effectiveness. NEPA requires preparation of
an EIS as early as possible, 7 5 when the maximum range of options
is available to the agency decisionmaker.17 6 The longer the agency
waits to preclude the lessee from drilling, if indeed it does so, the
more money, time and effort the lessee will spend on the project.
During this period, economic considerations gradually increase in
importance, and environmental considerations gradually decrease in
importance.117 The attendant pressures naturally may affect the
agency decisionmaker's frame of mind, regarding the relative impor-
tance of environmental goals and other public policy goals.'7 8
Thus, NSO leasing, by itself, may constitute a significant eco-
nomic and political commitment to oil and gas development. More-
over, leasing authorizes prospecting, and successful prospecting in-
creases the pressure for resource development. 7 9 These very real
pressures affect the people and the agencies charged with regulating
oil and gas development on public lands. While such pressures per-
haps are not readily quantifiable, their impact upon the fate of the
leased tract is not insignificant.
It is difficult to disagree with the Park County court when it notes,
"The expenditure in terms of tax dollars, manpower, and time in-
volved in preparing an EIS is substantial." 80 The expenditure is
172. See Edelson, supra note 31, at 946.
173. See Sohio Transp. Co. v. United States, 766 F.2d 499 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
174. See Edelson, supra note 31, at 958-59.
175. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
177. Edelson, supra note 31 at 947.
178. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clearly recognized this point in
Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1979). That court
stated: "This court has ...noted that delay in preparing an EIS may make all parties
less flexible. After major investment of both time and money, it is likely that more envi-
ronmental harm will be tolerated." Id. at 853. See also Latham v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111,
1121 (9th Cir. 1971).
179. See Edelson, supra note 31. As Edelson noted, "In general, there will be
much more pressure to permit development on a given area once seismic surveys indicate
the presence of valuable deposits than prior to such surveys." Id.
180. Park County, 817 F.2d at 623.
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substantial, and indeed it would become more substantial if an EIS
were required for NSO leases, although it would not rise to the
nightmarish proportions suggested by the court's misleading statis-
tics. Cost, however, is not dispositive with regard to implementing
NEPA. The court in Park County specifically recognized this
point.181 Moreover, as suggested above, costs would decrease sub-
stantially with imposition of more moderate leasing schedules and
increased fees to the lessee. These measures are not merely practical;
they reflect principles of considered, responsible decisionmaking con-
templated by NEPA.
NSO Leasing: A Questionable Means of Environmental Protection
Although NSO leasing purports to insure adequate environmental
analysis prior to development, questions exist as to the enforceability,
implementation and effectiveness of NSO leases."8 2 Although the
court in Sierra Club implicitly assumed that NSO Stipulations are
enforceable, the court in Conner rejected the use of NSO Stipula-
tions partly because, as it stated, these later could be modified and
even rescinded without preparation of an EIS.183 If the NSO Stipu-
lations are not enforced or enforceable, of course, the government
cannot prevent drilling and thus cannot insure that significant ad-
verse environmental impacts will not occur. The enforceability issue
must be resolved before full reliance may be placed on a policy of
NSO leasing.
Another potential problem with relying on NSO Stipulations is
that, even if they are enforceable, they may not be fully imple-
mented.18 4 There are indications that federal agencies may have
neither the funding nor the staff to continuously and vigorously en-
force these stipulations. 8 5 One commentator has noted: "[C]lean-up
measures and reclamation [may be] difficult to enforce even if stipu-
lated in leases."'8 6 If costs are being saved up front by not preparing
EISs for lease issuance, and if the government does not or cannot
pay the costs of proper implementation and enforcement of NSO
181. "Of course, such [financial] considerations are not dispositive of the legal re-
quirements under NEPA." Id. at 623-24.
182. For a good overview of these problems, see generally Edelson, supra note 31,
at 920-24.
183. Conner, 605 F. Supp. at 109.
184. Edelson, supra note 31, at 921-22.
185. Nelson, Oil and Gas Leasing on Forest Service Lands: A Question of NEPA
Compliance, 3 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1982).
186. Runge, supra note 2, at 62.
Stipulations, those costs must eventually be borne, at least in part,
by the leased lands themselves, in the form of environmental
degradation.
The general effectiveness of NSO Stipulations in precluding sig-
nificant impacts has been a matter of considerably differing opinion.
Sierra Club condoned the NSO approach as sufficient to comply
with NEPA; the court accorded the agency the discretion to choose
its preferred method of NEPA compliance (either preparing an EIS,
or attaching NSO Stipulations to the leases).187 The court in Bob
Marshall, on the other hand, rejected NSO Stipulations outright as
violative of NEPA, based on NEPA policy.""8
For purposes of environmental planning, the EIS should be pre-
pared early enough to "serve practically as an important contribu-
tion to the decisionmaking process and will not be used to rationalize
or justify decisions already made."1 89 EIS preparation draws atten-
tion to the proposed lease from Congress, the Executive, and the
public, and allows public participation, so that a more considered
decision may result.190 The court in Thomas v. Peterson" ' stated:
A central purpose of an EIS is to force the consideration of environmental
impacts in the decision making process .... That purpose requires that the
NEPA process be integrated with agency planning at the 'earliest possible
time,' 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1501.2, and the purpose cannot be fully served if
consideration of cumulative effects of successive interdependent steps is
delayed until after the first step has already been taken.9 2
Thus, NEPA's contemplation of an EIS as an effective planning de-
vice, as well as a project monitoring document, supports the notion
that NSO violated the policies and the spirit of NEPA.
CONCLUSION
Courts have treated with inconsistency the issue of whether an
EIS is required for the issuance of NSO and non-NSO leases. In
Sierra Club, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that the government had violated NEPA by issuing non-NSO leases
without preparing an EIS. In Conner, the district court held that an
EIS must be prepared even for NSO leases, since the NSO Stipula-
tions could later be modified or removed without preparation of an
EIS. In Bob Marshall, the same court again held that an EIS was
required for issuances of NSO leases, without discussing the
rescindability of the stipulations. The court held that NEPA requires
site-specific evaluation at the earliest meaningfully possible time in
187. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1415.
188. Bob Marshall, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20761.
189. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5.
190. Edelson, supra note 31, at 928.
191. 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985).
192. Id. at 757.
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the life of the project, that an EIS must be prepared when there
exists a potential for cumulative effects, and that conducting envi-
ronmental analysis in stages violates the spirit and the letter of
NEPA.
In a recent decision, Park County, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that leasing, with or without NSO Stipulations, does not
require an EIS. The Park County decision is problematic for a num-
ber of reasons. The court failed to accurately discuss the precise ef-
fects of the lease involved, and failed to discuss the case law constru-
ing NSO leases. Moreover, unlike the other cases, the court gave
little emphasis to the underlying policy behind the EIS requirement.
Thus, the decision confuses rather than clarifies the law regarding
application of NEPA's EIS requirement to oil and gas leasing on
public lands.
The problem with the legal dispute over NSO leasing is that the
dispute must be waged largely on the grounds of policy since NEPA
largely is a procedural statute. The substantive policy aspects of
NEPA take the form of generalities and exhortations, rather than
specific requirements. The "early application" policy is a good exam-
ple.193 Thus, it is difficult to answer with certainty whether issuing
NSO leases without an EIS violates NEPA. This Comment argues
that NSO leasing contravenes the spirit and purposes of NEPA. As
the Park County case indicates, however, this argument becomes less
persuasive where a particular set of facts leans strongly in one direc-
tion and the court is either less searching in its review or more flexi-
ble in its interpretation of NEPA.
Despite the problems discussed in this Comment, NSO leasing has
its benefits. For one thing, it saves the government money and re-
sources which would be spent on preparing EISs. To the extent that
NSO leasing keeps the leasing system flowing and puts leases into
the hands of those who want them, this also may be a benefit. A
large portion of leases expire with no test drilling, as many lease
holders apparently decide that the costs of development will exceed
the benefits. 94 Rather than using this phenomenon to argue for EISs
based on likelihood of development - an argument which subverts
NEPA by allowing the possibility of development without an EIS -
one simply might infer from this that, at least in theory, NSO leas-
ing is an effective way to expedite leasing and to conserve adminis-
193. See supra notes 161-69 and accompanying text.
194. Runge, supra note 2, at 60. The United States Geological Survey has esti-
mated that 75% of oil and gas leases on all federal lands expired with no test drilling. Id.
trative resources.
The main problem with NSO leasing is that it undermines
NEPA's functions as a land-planning statute. The other problem is
that the special facts of these cases - especially the existence of
wilderness qualities on the leased lands, which heightens the need for
early environmental review - so often are determinative in judicial
review of NSO lease issuances. The results may be good on a case-
by-case basis, but they are poor in terms of establishing consistency
and predictability in the law.
One solution might be for the government to adopt the likelihood
of development (and thus of environmental impact) as the determi-
native factor, not in whether to prepare an EIS, but in deciding
whether to issue an NSO lease or a regular lease. This idea has been
advocated specifically for Contingent Rights leases, 195 and it could
apply just as well to strict NSO leases (leases conveying vested drill-
ing rights but requiring slant drilling from surface lands adjacent to
the leased tract). Such an approach has the appeal of lending some
degree of consistency to administrative decisionmaking and judicial
review in this area, and yet it allows the land manager to retain
flexibility.
Given the shortcomings of judicial lawmaking in the area of
NEPA and oil and gas leasing, a legislative solution would seem de-
sirable. A number of bills are being considered in Congress which
would, among other things, require Forest Service and BLM land
management plans to include provisions for oil and gas leasing."0 6 It
makes sense to bring environmental decisions regarding the leasing
of specific lands within the framework of broader, substantive
agency planning, and to rely less on the somewhat piecemeal process
of lease evaluation through the EIS.
In the meantime, both the Conner and the Bob Marshall decisions
have been appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Oral ar-
guments have been made, and decisions in these cases are expected
to be issued in early 1988. The facts of the Park County case - the
lack of wilderness qualities on the leased lands, and the extensive
mitigation measures adopted in the lease - were strong factors in
195. McCrum, supra note 118, at 57.
Where the likelihood of actual development is sufficiently high and [environ-
mental] impacts are expected to be significant, it makes sense to prepare the
EIS at the leasing stage and grant the lessee full development rights. However,
where the actual development - and the attendant governmental royalty - is
perceived to be a remote possibility, contingent right leasing provides a low-
cost option for the government to get some limited exploration and develop-
ment rights into the hands of private industry, without preparing an EIS, or
even an EA, and without violating NEPA.
Id.
196. Senate Committee Votes No On Environmental Leasing Reforms, 19 SIERRA
CLUB NAT'L NEWS REP. No. 15, Aug. 5, 1987, at 2-3.
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favor of upholding the lease issuance. Moreover, the Park County
court's analysis of the lease stipulations, cumulative effects, and tier-
ing reflects the view that EIS preparation depends on the lessee's
plans, rather than on the scope of the rights conveyed. This view
elevates administrative convenience over environmental protection of
public lands. Clearly, leasing itself can significantly affect the envi-
ronment. Given the distinctive facts of that case, as well as the
weaknesses in the court's NEPA analysis, the Ninth Circuit should
not find Park County a barrier in affirming the holdings in Conner
and Bob Marshall to require an EIS at the leasing stage for NSO
and non-NSO leases.
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